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PROPERTY-EASEMENTS IN GROSS AND
EASEMENTS APPURTENANT
Complainant owned thirty acres which was being developed
for residences. At that part of the property fronting on the highway,
complainant erected a sign made of two upright posts and three
horizontal boards. The top board was inscribed, "Woodland Acres",
next board, "E. J. Dent, Jr. Developer," and the last one, "New
Homes". Complainant sold this lot with residence thereon to defendants and inserted in the deed: "Reserving unto the parties of
the first part the right to maintain its subdivision sign in its present location, with the right of ingress and egress, thereto for the
purpose of maintainance and repairs." Defendants later removed
the two lower boards and refused to permit complainant to replace
them, whereupon complainant sought injunctive relief. The trial
court granted relief because the Chancellor was of the opinion that
the clause quoted constituted a covenant running with the land,
and there was no ambiguity in the clause. On appeal, held, reversed
and remanded. The clause constituted an easement in gross, but parol evidence was admissible to show that the easement was to last a
certain period. If there was not an agreed period, then the easement
would terminate when the purpose (which was sale of all the lots)
was accomplished. Reed v. Dent, 194 Va. 156, 72 S.E.2d 255
(1952).
Defendant conveyed the mineral rights of certain land to Ritter
Company by the usual type deed, which also provided: "All the
rights, rights of way, privileges and easements herein mentioned
shall forever run with and be appurtenant to any and all the coal
and other substances above numerated, in, on or under the tract of
land herein described, and in, on and under any other lands now
owned or hereafter acquired by the party of the second part, its
successors or assigns". Ritter Company also acquired coal rights
in other lands in this general area. Stokes Company which already
owned coal rights in other tracts including the Slocum and Kroll
tracts leased eleven tracts from Ritter, and although the Matney
tract was not included in the eleven, Riter purportedly gave Stokes
the right to move any coal mined in any tract across the Matney
property. Stokes attempted by mandatory injunction to haul coal
over defendant's land. The trial court refused to grant the injunction. On appeal, held, affirmed. Since the Slocum and Kroll
tracts had never been owned by Ritter, the easement was not for

the benefit of those tracts, and an appurtenant easement cannot be
converted into an easement in gross. William S. Stokes, Jr., Inc.
v. Matney 194 Va. 339, 73 S.E.2d 269 (1952).
There has been much conflict on the status of easements in
gross and appurtenant easements in regard to the uses made of the
property to which they pertain. The courts have been reluctant to
allow easements in gross if there is a chance that the easement may
be appurtenant. The court claimed the easement allowed in the
Reed case was in gross as it was "a mere personal interest in, or
right to use, the land of another." 1 It would seem that the court
was justified in so holding unless it could be argued that the easement benefitted the rest of the thirty acre tract to which it was
adjacent, and belonged with the remaining tract of land. "A way is
never presumed to be in gross when it can be construed to be appurtenant, and the parties are presumed to contract in reference to
the condition of property at the time of the sale."'2 This was not
discussed in the case though there is authority to the effect that an
easement may be appurtenant to land even though the servient
tenement is not adjacent to the dominant.3 It would seem, however,
that the better view is that this was an easement in gross and the
parties intended it to be a personal right to help the plaintiffs in
the advertising of the subdivision.
If the defendants introduce oral evidence insufficient to establish that there was an agreement when the deed was executed
which permitted removal of the signs at the expiration of eighteen
months from the date of the deed, the court must decide the time
limit to place on this easement, as no particular time was set forth
in the reservation in the deed itself. 4 Because of the ambiguity
of the written instrument the court allowed parol evidence and
extraneous facts to show the intention of the parties.
It could reasonably be concluded that the sole purpose of the
sign was to advertise the land and therefore the sign should be left
unimpaired until this purpose was completed. There is a well established rule that an easement may be terminated by the completion of the purpose for which it was granted inasmuch as the reason
for, and necessity of, the servitude are at an end. Thus, if an ease-
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ment is granted for a particular purpose only, the right continues
while the dominant tenement is used for that purpose, but ceases
when the specified use ceases. 5 This impliedly refers to easements
appurtenant but is equally reasonable to determine the duration of
easements in gross. Under such circumstances the court would be
justified in issuing an injunction to last as long as the complainants
had good cause to advertise the lots of the subdivision for sale and
development. As an easement in gross is a personal interest, it
would not be transferable to a subsequent real estate dealer who
might purchase the entire tract.
The case of Stoke's v. Matney illustrates the attempt to extend
an appurtenant easement beyond the servient estate. The easement
originally granted to Ritter was appurtenant to that tract of land
owned by Ritter. The weight of authority supports the rule that an
easement may be appurtenant to land even though the servient
tenement is not adjacent to the dominant. 6 This would not apply to
the Stokes case, however, as the Slocum and Kroll tracts cannot
be called dominant estates.
An easement appurtenant to land cannot be converted into an
easement in gross. To hold contra to this would subject the servient
tenement to numerous burdens which clearly was not the intention
of the parties. "Owner of an appurtenant easement cannot separate
it from the dominant estate by grant so as to convert it into an
easement in gross. He cannot enlarge the right or retain any interest therein separate and distinct from the land to which it belongs. The owner of the dominant tenement cannot subdivide the
easement by granting rights in it to one who has no title or interest
in that estate. For example, the owner of a way cannot authorize a
stranger to use it when he is not coming to or from the dominant
tenement."' 7 A fortiori the grantee of an easement could not authorize a stranger to use it when he is not coming to or from the
dominant tenement.
A landowner who has the right to use a private way going to
and from certain land cannot go out of the limits of the way nor
use it as an easement for the benefit of any other tract of land than
that for which it was originally established.8
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An easement appurtenant is a burden upon the servient estate.
The owner of the dominant estate cannot by any act of his own, independent of the consent of the owner of the servient estate, use
the easement or authorize it to be used for the benefit of any lands
other than those to which it adheres, or without such consent broaden the use beyond its creation. 9 Otherwise the burden upon the servient estate would thereby be increased without the consent of the
owner thereof. Such an easement cannot be severed from the estate
to which it is attached and made the subject of an independent conveyance; nor can an easement appurtenant by any act of the owner
of the dominant estate be changed into an easement in gross. 10 "The
way is granted for the benefit of the particular land, and its use is
limited to the use in connection with the enjoyment of such land.
Such a way cannot be converted into a public way without the
consent of the grantors and the grantors have the right to rely on
its use being limited to the purpose for which it is granted--or in
other words, its legal use,-and can prevent the use of the way for
purposes not authorized."' 1
One who, in connection with a grant of a parcel of land,
receives a grant of an easement to himself, heirs, and assigns of a
grant of way across remaining property of the grantor to the highway, cannot grant rights in the easement to a stranger having no
interest in the land granted, since it is solely appurtenant to the
12
tract conveyed.
"Even rarer than cases of changing easements in gross to
easements appurtenant are cases in which the intention appears to
permit what was created as an easement appurtenant to be changed
into an easement in gross. Hence it will be assumed, in the absence
of an affirmative showing to the contrary, that an appurtenant
easement cannot be divorced from the dominant tenement in such
a way as to permit it to become an easement in gross or become
appurtenant to another tenement." 13
It is submitted that the foregoing statements are all in accord
with the decision of the court in the Stokes case. However an interesting possibility exists in regard to the wording of the easement.
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The deed to Ritter stated that the easement is "appurtenant to any
and all the coal .... in, on or under the tract of land herein described, and in, on and under any other lands now owned or hereafter acquired by the party of the second part (Ritter), its successors
or assigns." [Italics added] It has been held that where an easement
has been granted or reserved by deed, the ordinary rule which
governs in the construction of other writings prevails, namely that
the rights of the parties must be ascertained from the words of the
deed and the extent of the easement cannot be determined from
any other source. 14 Thus it would appear that if Stokes were to
convey the Slocum and Kroll tracts to Ritter and have Ritter reconvey the tracts, this would satisfy the language of the deed and
Stokes would have a valid easement appurtenant to those lands.
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